Reforms for the External Legitimacy in the Post Rose Revolution Georgia. Case of University Autonomy by Jibladze, Elene
7 
Thematic Article 
  
Hungarian Educational Research Journal 
2017, Vol. 7(1) 7–27 
© The Author(s) 2017 
http://herj.lib.unideb.hu 
Debrecen University Press 
 
DOI: 10.14413/herj.2017.01.02. 
Reforms for the external legitimacy in the post 
Rose Revolution Georgia. Case of university 
autonomy 
Elena Jibladze1 
Abstract 
This article investigates higher education system-change in a region undergoing post-
Soviet transition, specifically – in post-Rose Revolution Georgia. It considers the Bologna 
Process-inspired reforms that represent instances of transnational policy and 
institutional transfer into national contexts. On the example of university autonomy, the 
article argues that in Georgia, Bologna-inspired reforms were introduced in order to gain 
legitimacy in the global higher education arena. However, these reforms have produced a 
symbolic system-change and have created decoupled institutions. The findings of the 
article bare policy relevance to those post-Soviet transition countries that have embarked 
or plan to embark on transformative changes in their national (higher) education systems.  
Keywords: university autonomy, post-Soviet transition, Bologna Process, transnational 
policy transfer, decoupled institutions  
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Introduction 
Higher education (HE) reforms that were launched by the Government of Georgia (GoG) 
after the Rose Revolution were largely framed by the Bologna Process. The country joined 
the Bologna Process in 2005 and the reforms that followed this affiliation were perceived 
as successful by both domestic and international actors (Crosier et al, 2007; MES, 2006). 
This analysis contests positive assessment of the reforms and suggests that while the 
reforms dramatically altered the institutional framework of HE in the country, they hardly 
contributed to the overall improvement of the HE climate in the country.  
The main question that has been usually posed with regards to lack of development in 
the HE systems in general and vis-à-vis the Bologna-guided reforms in this region, is about 
seeking proximity of the local HE systems to the Western European educational models 
and explaining the challenges that hinder this approximation. The explanations that are 
provided in this regard, analyze internal factors that could hamper the progress in the HE 
system. The authors usually appeal to two factors: omnipresent corruption (Osipian, 
2007, 2008, 2014; Heyneman, Anderson & Nuraliyeva, 2008) and strong Soviet legacy 
(Dobbins & Khachatryan, 2014; Heyneman, 2007; Silova & Steiner-Khamsi, 2008).  
However, neither of these arguments are revealing when exploring the Georgian case 
since corruption was addressed during the state reforms and was considered as one of 
the uncontested successful reforms of the post-revolution government (Kupatadze, 2012; 
Mitchell, 2013). The preservationist arguments also run thin, given that the post-
revolution government had made a conscious political choice to disregard, discredit and 
fight the Soviet legacies. This research suggests that the spectrum of the analytical tools 
should be refined by considering different internal factors to allow more accurate 
understanding of the challenges in the HE systems of the post-Soviet transition.  
It should be highlighted that this research aims to understand the reasons for the 
discrepancy between the successful institutional transformation of the HE system and its 
poor results. The analyses explores the rationale behind the adoption of the reforms that 
were primarily concerned with the alteration of the institutional framework of the HE 
system and poses the following research question: why did the post-revolution government 
adopt Bologna-inspired reforms to transform the Georgian HE system? To answer this 
question, the case of HE reforms is situated within the globalization processes that 
diffuses neoliberal agenda across the countries and interprets the behavior of post-
revolution government from the point of view of the state at the Europe’s periphery. 
Literature that is dedicated to the HE system development in Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE) offers useful insights in this regard. The most common theme in the literature is 
Europeanization of the HE systems in this part of Europe and the role of the Bologna 
Process in this endeavor. The majority of works stem from the common aim to address 
dual agenda of the CEE states’ post-communist reconstruction and their EU accession. 
Here, authors largely assess the impact of the Bologna Process and its specific goals on 
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the national HE systems (see Deca, 2015; Kwiek, 2012; Leisyte, Zelvys and Zenkiene, 
2015; Oprean, 2007;, Pabian, 2010;, Zgaga and Miklavič, 2011 for selected country cases). 
On the one hand, the authors treat the Process as an opportunity for the HE systems to 
modernize and contribute to the CEE states’ European integration (e.g. Zgaga, 2003; 
Pabian, 2010). On the other hand, there are Bologna-skeptics, who argue with 
disappointment, that the Process had a potential to act as a HE system transformer in this 
region, but the authors of the Process did not fully explore this opportunity (e.g. Kwiek, 
2004). On a more critical note, the authors recognize the coercive economic agenda 
behind the Bologna Process that is in line with the global neoliberal agenda (See Kwiek, 
2004; Neave, 2004, 2012; Tomusk, 2007).  
While this body of literature is informative in revealing the complexities of the HE system 
change in the countries of post-communist transition and critically assess the role of the 
Bologna Process in the formation of the HE system, authors largely emphasize the 
coercive nature of the Process, but neglect the voluntary institutional transfer. However, 
the distinguishing feature of the Georgian case is that the post-revolution government 
deliberately embarked on the neoliberal reforms. The GoG enthusiastically shared the 
neoliberal idea of knowledge economy and viewed education as a root of Georgia’s 
economic development.  
Moving beyond the argument of the coercive nature of the globalized neoliberal script, 
this research anchors its argument in the Sociological Neo-institutionalism, specifically 
world society theories. The argument of institutional emulation is well elaborated here 
and suggests that the states and policy makers are enculturated in the neoliberal 
discourse and voluntarily opt for the neoliberal reforms (Meyer, 2015). The primary 
motivation of the states (especially at the periphery) to adopt transnational policy models 
(Bologna Process-inspired educational models in this case) is to gain legitimacy at the 
global political and economic arena (Meyer, 2000). However, new institutions that serve 
as transnationally created models neglect the national context. Therefore, institutional 
reforms only symbolically change the systems and in reality create decoupled institutions.  
Based on these considerations, the author argues that Georgia as a state at Europe’s 
periphery chose to join the Bologna Process to ensure institutional proximity with the 
educational models that were promoted by the Process and in this way gain legitimacy in 
the common European Higher Education Area (EHEA). Consequently, the Georgian HE 
system has indeed gained high institutional proximity to its Western prototypes, however 
it has failed to address the reality of its own, thus creating decoupled institutions in the 
system (Jibladze, 2016). Using the example of the university autonomy reform, the 
research establishes that the policy makers have introduced the legislative changes to 
accommodate the rhetoric employed by the Bologna Process on promoting ‘impartiality 
with accountability’. Furthermore, it was analyzed whether the university autonomy, as 
an institution is decoupled, as it is suggested by the world society theory in the context of 
policy change aiming at external legitimacy.  
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University Autonomy - Analytical considerations  
The authors who write about the neoliberal pressures and influences of market logic in 
HE, treat university autonomy as an amalgam of the Western idea of the University, which 
is an impartial knowledge generator and transmitter (Neave, 2012) and ever so 
increasingly popularized idea of the HEIs as autonomous, self-sustained actors on the 
competitive market (Lynch, 2004; Naidoo, 2008). As mentioned earlier, the institutions 
that are carriers of the neoliberal norms present the main interest to this research. From 
the point of view of policy transfer, university autonomy represents a transnational 
construct that was introduced in the Georgian HE system through the Bologna Process. 
University autonomy reforms are discussed through the lenses of the world society 
theory.  
The World Society theory argues that states decide to transfer the transnationally 
promoted models of education domestically, seeking legitimacy in the global educational 
arena. While doing so, the states overlook whether these transnational educational 
models match the local context (Drori et al., 2006; Meyer et al., 1997). The quest for 
legitimacy does not necessarily aim to address the issues that exist in higher education, 
but it intends to create a framework that is easily recognizable to, and acknowledged by 
Western European actors. Thus, creating locally decoupled institutions, which only 
symbolically meet the external expectations (often manifested in the structural 
similarities), but serve a different purpose domestically (Meyer et al., 1997). The authors 
assert that during the globalized policy adoption the context is neglected in favor of the 
universally acknowledged institutions, therefore, the reformed systems end up being 
locally decoupled. One of the main manifestations of decoupling is symbolic change, which 
is when institutional frames are aligned with the globally promoted prototypes, but the 
purpose of the institution does not match the purpose of its global prototype (Meyer, 
2000). In order to assess whether the university autonomy reforms produced decoupled 
institutions, brief conceptual clarification needs to be made regarding the purpose and 
intuitional frame of the university autonomy. Below, the conceptual toolkit is put together 
mainly based on the definitions of the university autonomy tool devised by the European 
University Association (EUA).  
There is no one precise definition or understanding of university autonomy. However, 
scholars unanimously treat university autonomy as an ultimate principle of HE 
governance and acknowledge that university autonomy is multidimensional. This is 
maintained by all of its interpretations (see Bladh, 2007; Henkel, 2007; Neave, 2006). 
Moreover, the EUA shies away from providing a definition, but describes university 
autonomy as the relation between the state and the Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) 
and the degree of control that the state exercises towards the HEIs (Estermann & Nokkala, 
2009; Estermann et al., 2011). With the rise of importance of the Bologna Process, the 
attention toward university autonomy grew at the policy level within the signatory 
countries. The association has developed the university autonomy tool that identifies four 
main dimensions of autonomy. The tool considers the multiple voices that discuss 
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university autonomy and reconciles them in the main elements of each dimension in a 
coherent manner. These four dimensions are: organizational autonomy, financial 
autonomy, staffing autonomy, academic autonomy (Estermann & Nokkala, 2009, 
Estermann et al., 2011). Therefore, the combination of these dimensions comprehensively 
describes the relation between the state and the HEIs and the degree of control that the 
state exercises towards the HEIs.  
This analysis is guided by the four dimensions of the University Autonomy Tool of the 
EUA. However, all four dimensions could not be accounted for separately, such as those 
that were not reflected in the legal framework that governs HE. More specifically, in 
Georgian Higher Education Law, while organizational autonomy is substantially 
presented as the main state priority (Law on Higher Education 2004, Article 2, Section b), 
less attention is paid to academic and financial autonomy, and staffing autonomy is hardly 
captured. As a result, this analysis is based on three dimensions of the university that are 
defined in accordance to the University Autonomy Tool. The organizational autonomy 
refers to the ability and the authority of a HEI to determine its own goals, appoint its 
governing body, and choose and employ its faculty and staff (Estermann et al., 2011). For 
the purposes of the analysis, elements of the staffing autonomy were integrated with the 
organizational autonomy, treating the prior as an important, but a composite part of the 
latter. The financial autonomy refers to the capacity of the HEI to acquire and allocate 
funding, to set tuition fees, and to own and manage buildings/infrastructure (Estermann 
et al., 2011). Academic autonomy is the “capacity to define the academic profile, to 
introduce degree programms, to define the structure and content of degree programms, 
(…) and the extent of control over student admissions” (Estermann & Nokkala, 2009, p. 
32).  
The analysis that follows is presented according to three dimensions of the university 
autonomy presented above. First, the analysis compares the main purpose of university 
autonomy in Georgia with that promoted by the Bologna Process. At the instances when 
purpose of the university autonomy diverges from that promoted by the Bologna Process, 
the rationale behind the policy makers’ choice of not following the original purpose of the 
institution is analyzed. In the same manner, the structure of university autonomy is also 
discussed in juxtaposition to the three-dimensional autonomy model and the reasons of 
divergence are explained.  
Data collection and research methods 
This is a qualitative study, which covers the first six years of the HE reforms in the country 
(2004- 2010). Two methods were used to collect the data: document analysis and in-
depth interviews. 
The launching point of this analysis is the Law on Higher Education of Georgia that was 
adopted in 2004. Findings in the Law are supplemented with the secondary literature on 
the university autonomy reforms in Georgia. These mainly represent the governmental 
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reports, as well as analytical accounts of the international and transnational 
organizations, such as United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), World Bank and 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID).  
While the base of documents revealed the structural determinants of university 
autonomy, the interviews aimed at investigating the role of local actors in the 
reform. Forty in-person interviews were collected mainly during three visits in Georgia in 
2010-2011 years. Representatives of top and middle management of the Ministry of 
Education and Science (MES), top and middle management representatives of the 
National Education Accreditation Centre (NEAC) and of the five2 state universities 
included in the analyses were interviewed; third party representatives – NGOs and HE 
experts – were also approached.  
The interview guide had two kinds of questions: descriptive questions and explanatory 
questions. The first aimed to collect accurate information to bridge the gaps in the six-
years of HE reforms that were not reflected in the analyzed documents. The second type 
of questions was seeking for interviewees’ interpretation of the reform processes. All the 
interviews were conducted in the Georgian language. Collected material was analyzed by 
the ATLASti. The interviews were coded in two steps. First, by topical coding, where main 
themes that the interviewees deemed important were identified and an extensive list with 
the corresponding quotes was created. Later on, these themes were submerged into 
larger topics. Analytical clusters were identified in the second phase of analysis.  
University Autonomy as part of the HE system decentralization 
In order to understand whether an institution is decoupled, this section discusses the 
main purpose of university autonomy in the Georgian HE system. Moreover, the structural 
elements of university autonomy are identified, and the policy makers’ reasons to 
introduce the concept and policies with regard to the university autonomy are explored. 
This is done in order to establish whether university autonomy was introduced to 
institutionalize the principles of ‘impartiality with accountability’ or to gain legitimacy at 
the European Higher Education Area.  
During the field work, the purpose of university autonomy as of a generic principle of HE 
governance was explored first. Secondly, the policy makers’ perceptions concerning the 
separate dimensions of university autonomy were collected and analyzed to see how 
much they were aligned with the articulated purpose of university autonomy. 
Furthermore, the main elements of the structure of each dimension were assessed. Lastly, 
the set of variables for each dimension of the autonomy developed by the EUA in the 
University Autonomy Tool was used to guide the analysis of the collected material. 
                                                          
2 Five out of 15 state accredited universities (according to the 2010 NEAC data). Three in the capital and 
two in eastern and western centers of the country.  
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However, these indicators were not strictly applied to the analysis, for measuring the level 
of university autonomy falls beyond the scope of this article.  
Organizational Autonomy: decentralization under supervision 
The Law on Higher Education provided legal bases for the HEIs to carry out 
administrative, financial and academic activities independently, without state intrusion. 
In the law, autonomy is defined as “freedom of the HEI and its main units to independently 
decide and implement its academic, financial and economic, and administrative activities” 
(Law on Higher Education 2004, Article 2, Section b). Furthermore, the law introduced 
principles of HEI governance by separating academic and administrative functions, and 
establishing separate decision making bodies - the Academic Council and the Senate. The 
law established that a Rector is an elected figure, and sought to ensure student’ 
involvement in university governance (Law on Higher Education, 2004). The law’s 
content thus fully corresponds to the building elements of organizational autonomy 
proposed by the Bologna Process and reinforced by the EUA reports.  
However, in the Georgian HE system the structural elements of organizational autonomy 
were not necessarily linked to the declared purpose of organizational autonomy. 
Although the law established the HEIs as autonomous governing actors, at the same time, 
it created a rigid legal framework to guide the autonomous action. The elements such as 
organizational set up, division of functions between decision making bodies, quota for the 
student representation in the decision-making bodies, the election rules of decision 
making bodies and an executive head (rector) were defined in the law to the point of 
procedural nuances. Hence, the statement about the organizational autonomy of the HEI 
and the level of detail to which the granted autonomy was regulated clashed.  
This contradiction is well observed in the example of the rector’s elections. For instance, 
sub-section 2 of Section 22 reads: “the academic council elects the rector with a secret 
ballot, with the majority of the vote. Duration of the rector’s term in service is defined by 
the statute of the HEI. The term should not exceed the duration of the council’s term of 
operation.” (Law on Higher Education, 2004, Chapter 4, Section 22, sub-section 2). Sub-
section 3 goes into greater detail: “the academic council announces the call for 
applications no later than 1 month before the registration and no later than 3 months 
before the elections … carried out in accordance to the principles of transparency, 
impartiality and competition” (Law on Higher Education, 2004, Chapter 4, Section 22, sub-
section 3). Sub-section 4 defines that a candidate can serve only for two terms and sub-
section 5 defines the circumstances under which the head of administration can be elected 
as a rector. The list continues. A university faculty member expressed concern that the 
detailed provisions in the law only changed the organizational makeover of the HEIs, 
however the ministry took away the leverage of the autonomous action from the HEIs and 
maintained the centralized command: 
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Adoption of a very detailed higher education law, which defines how the dean should be elected, 
what should be the framework of the faculty [academic department], etc. … this is a major issue! 
First, it constrains the autonomy of the university. But secondly, it constrains the capacity of 
participation in the decision making [in the HEI]. Even if these are centralized [at the HEI level] 
decisions (R3-HEI1). 
Therefore, these detailed provisions in the law took away the possibility for the HEIs to 
exercise self-governance. I term this state of affairs as decentralization under supervision. 
Organizational autonomy reforms fell under the government’s rhetoric of creating a small 
and efficient government through de-regulation and decentralization. Reorganization of 
the state HEIs was a product of decentralization of the HE system and, as it is discussed 
below, the policy makers’ decision to decentralize under supervision was purposeful. 
Policy makers were mainly driven by two reasons in their approach. The head of the law 
department at the MES (in 2004) was well aware that the HE system that they had put 
together in 2004 did not leave much room for independent action. Thus, she very clearly 
explained the aspirations and the rationale of the policy makers’ decision to decentralize 
under supervision: 
The system that was designed was quite rigid and applied to all universities. … We had to create 
a system that had never existed before. Professors did not have enough information on how 
universities were governed abroad. … In absence of previous experience of [and awareness 
about] the civic responsibility, there was a fear, that [HEIs] would not be able to bear this 
responsibility, unless the law regulated the process of the reform implementation in detail. (R42 
- PA11) 
Effectively, during the phase of policy design, policy makers faced the problem that the 
democratic institutions as well as the experience of democratic action were absent in the 
HEIs. Consequently, they decided to introduce the democratic institutions but accompany 
those with the authoritative means to ‘educate’ the HE community to an appropriate 
action. The new government was well aware that the window of opportunity for the 
system’s transformation was only open for a limited amount of time. Therefore, many of 
the principles that the policy makers found necessary for the system to develop in a 
healthy manner were overshadowed by the practical circumstances of the short-time 
frame. This is the reason, why the former Minister of Education (in the office in February-
December, 2009) did not find it surprising that the principle of university autonomy was 
compromised during the reforms:  
Autonomy was not a priority in the first years of the reform. On the contrary, it was suspended, 
because the priority was to transform the system in a short time. (R37-PA6) 
This reason was coupled with a mistrust of the policy makers toward the HEI community’s 
capacity for positive change. It was manifested in the ‘problem of rectors’, as a majority of 
the interviewed policy makers labeled it. As one of the main figures at the MES explained, 
before the revolution the ministry faced an unresolved problem of the state university 
rectors. The rectors had privileged position in the HE system and governed the 
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universities according to their private interests. They were under the personal patronage 
of the President Shevardnadze (in the office from 1995 to 2003). Thus, over the course of 
the following years the state HEIs became closed systems that did not practice any 
accountability measures towards the state (or wider public for that matter). It was 
believed that they were involved in various corruption schemes even going beyond the 
practiced favors in admission. The common example was the use of university-owned 
premises to operate business enterprises that were owned by the rector’s families. This 
situation lingered until the 2003 revolution, when the power flux created a window of 
opportunity to confront the rectors.  
The problem of corrupt rectors was framed as a political threat to the legitimacy of the 
new government and thus, to the political stability of the country. In the interviews, some 
of the policy makers were of the opinion that the rectors had created political hubs in their 
universities, hence they could manipulate the students against the government. 
Therefore, it was important to remove the political undercurrent from the HEIs. 
According to the second Minister of Education and Science, the HEIs needed to be free 
from ideology and this was accomplished by the new government (R7-HEI2). In other 
words, at the system-level the awareness of what was happening within the universities 
did not exist before the revolution. For this reason, the number one problem identified by 
the policy makers was to shake the ‘feudal dominions’ of the rectors and subsequently, 
turn the HEIs into manageable organizations (R7-HEI2).  
Overall, decentralization with supervision was justified because of the time brevity and 
institutional fragility of the newly built system. At the same time, the mistrust for the HEI 
community not to abuse the decentralized system convinced the policy makers to 
maintain the rigid legal framework. However, it is more important to note that regardless 
of the legal framework’s peculiarities, in practice both ministry as well as the HEIs 
compromised the principles of organizational autonomy. Local expert, involved in the 
reorganization of one of the state universities pointed out that legal framework and the 
reality in the HEIs were decoupled. 
De Jure you have everything (in order). Councils hold meetings. They raise hands (to vote). 
Someone’s for and someone’s against. You have all documented in minutes… but […] on paper 
everything is fine, while the reality is different. (R44-LExpert 2) 
The election process had been repeatedly contested by the involvement of the MES. In 
2005, the state HEIs had to start the reorganization process according to the provisions 
in the new Law, which stipulated that by 2007 all the state HEIs had to create 
representative decision-making bodies and elect the rector (Law on Higher Education 
2004, Chapter 14). In the process, those rectors that had held the positions before the 
revolution, were dismissed and the Minister of Education and Science appointed interim 
rectors.  
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Within one month after the appointments, the first elections took place. In all five state 
universities included in this analysis interim rectors were the only candidates to the 
position of an executive head of the HEI. Subsequently, they were elected by the academic 
council. Therefore, in contrast to the former deputy minister’s statement that the rector’s 
elections increased the autonomy of the universities (R38-PA7), HEI representatives 
thought otherwise. One of the policy makers and currently, a faculty member of a state 
university shared his observations that what was provided by the law, was overridden by 
the government itself.  
The rectors of the universities are (meant to be) elective bodies. In reality, the state still partakes 
in it. For instance at Georgian Technical University (as well in others). Therefore, (HEIs) are not 
actually independent. They depend on 1. funding, 2. political weather, 3. rectors that are (at first) 
appointed (by the ministry) – later get elected (by the academic council). […] the process in not 
political but is influenced by the politicians. For instance, last year, firing of one rector (provides 
the name) met high resistance, because he had a strong lobby (from the politicians). (R10-HEI2) 
The same perception is confirmed in different ways by the representatives of other HEIs. 
The expectation that the state would informally intervene and override the formal rules 
that the government instituted itself, was confirmed for many. It was believed that these 
dismissals, or new appointments were not initiated from within the universities, but from 
the outside. Consequently, this created mistrust among the faculty as well as within the 
representatives of the non-governmental sector towards the ministry’s genuine 
intentions to decentralize the HE system and ‘set the universities free’ (R7-HEI 2, R43-
LExpert 1, R44-LExpert2).  
The inclination toward increased regulation of the HEIs was apparent in the interviews. 
The former Deputy Minister explained that if there were certain deviations in the newly 
created HE system, those were usually addressed by issuing additional decrees (R42-
PA11). The former Head of the national QA agency justified the central government’s close 
supervision of the HEIs with a sentiment that without their guidance, the universities 
acted as ‘abandoned children’ (R33-PA2).  
In turn, the HEIs practiced compliance, which reinforced the government’s conviction that 
the HEIs were still too fragile to assume autonomous action. As discussed earlier (pp.13-
14) governing bodies never actually became decision-making units at the universities. 
The division of power hardly materialized and the university remained an oligarchy 
where the authority of the rector was supreme. With constant intrusion of the MES in the 
election processes of rectors in the state universities, the illusion among the HEI 
representatives that the state intended to withdraw vanished, and HEIs adhered to the 
centralized rule of the MES. 
In essence, the HE system was established with the formally decentralized HEI structure 
that lacked organizational autonomy. Policy makers formulated the legislative framework 
in a preventative manner to avoid errors in the fragile system at the expense of actual 
organizational autonomy.  
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To summarize, organizational autonomy is locally decoupled, as its main purpose was to 
breach the oligarchy of the rectors in the state HEIs. This was accomplished with the 
decentralization of the HEI’s organizational structure. Effectively, the purpose of the 
organizational autonomy did not match the Bologna Process prototype. However, the 
main structural elements of the organizational autonomy were present in the system and 
in the case of university autonomy, the decentralization mechanisms were labeled as 
(organizational) autonomy. For the policy makers, decentralization was a measure to 
minimize the risk of accumulating the power in the rector’s hands. Therefore, it was not 
the autonomy, but the closely supervised decentralization of university life.  
Academic Autonomy  
In this section attention is paid to the ability of the HEI to manage its own academic 
content and its capacity to decide on the number of students and the admission criteria 
(Estermann & Nokkala, 2009; Estermann et al., 2011). According to the law, the state 
ensured “freedom of an HEI to determine independently its strategy, methodology and 
contents of teaching and research” (Law on Higher Education 2004, Section 1). This 
statement did not include the elements such as student admission, introduction of 
academic programs, nor the language of instruction as part of the academic autonomy. 
One of the policy makers considered that since the HEIs could manage their own teaching 
plans, it already provided considerable ‘academic autonomy’ to the institution.  
 If we look into the law of Soviet times, it will become clear that the academic [teaching] plan 
was developed by the ministry. Now this is no longer the case. The ministry set the universities 
free (R7-HEI2). 
The interviewee views the matter of the academic autonomy as part of the overall 
decentralization policy. The decision that the ministry was no longer in control of the 
academic plans of HEIs was a step forward in the decentralization process and not 
particularly, towards ensuring academic autonomy, however this was sufficient for the 
decision makers. The discussion with the policy makers did not go further than this 
regarding the academic autonomy, as they considered it premature to be concerned with 
the academic autonomy before the institutional transformation of the HE system.  
Policy makers were disproportionately concerned with and focused on the institutional 
problems of the HE system. As discussed in the previous section, problems such as corrupt 
rectors were considered of the highest priority thus the need to build a transparent, 
efficient and accountable HE system was also emphasized. This was complimented by the 
poor education quality in the HEIs. The academic programs lacked structure, the courses 
were redundant, program offerings were outdated, and many of the programs simply had 
no counterpart in the international education space. As respondents explained, the 
academic offerings were catered to the individual professors, their availability and 
expertise which, at very least, compromised the coherence of the academic programs 
(R44-LExpert 2; R1-HEI1; R5-HEI1). Faced with this challenge, policy makers considered 
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it most important to bring coherence to the academic life. One of the policy makers shared 
his assessment of the situation in the Georgian HEIs by 2004:  
It was not important for the universities how teaching or research was developing within the 
institution. In fact, state did not demand much either. Thus, no one asked for, for instance, course 
content. Secondly, it was vague, how learning was recognized. There was no measure for it. 
While I think that the number of credits is a superficial measure to grant a degree, it is still better 
than nothing. One department claimed one thing and the other one claimed [something] 
completely different. (R10-HEI2)  
A policy solution to address the issues of poor education-quality was creation of the 
quality assurance (QA) system. In Georgia, QA system was set up according to the basic 
recommendations of European Association for Quality Assurance in Higher Education 
(ENQA). External QA was provided by the independent body – the National Education 
Accreditation Centre (NEAC). The QA process was guided by the QA criteria; HEIs’ self-
assessment as well as the peer-review was based on these very criteria; HEIs developed 
internal QA processes. Ideally, independent QA system would be one of the guarantors of 
the academic autonomy (Estermann et al., 2011). Except, in the Georgian HE context, 
independent NEAC maintained subordinate relations with the MES and assumed the role 
of a state regulator. As the collected evidence shows, policy makers continued to 
introduce system-wide policies that would standardize and closely regulate HEI life. The 
QA system became a tool to create a level playing field among the HEIs. One of the former 
deputy ministers explained that through QA it became possible to move from the outdated 
teaching practices toward student-centered learning.  
The primary aim (of the QA) is to reorganize teaching planning process. So that the student’s 
work load and the professor’s work load were somehow balanced in the course. Creation of 
internal QA units improved teaching processes in the HEIs. i.e. what should be the number of 
credits for a course? How should the (course) components be distributed? – these all are 
controlled by the QA (R38 - PA 7).  
Through the criteria of the institutional accreditation, the policy makers aimed to create 
a situation where academic programs would be comparable within the country, as well as 
outside. In order to ensure coherence, the policy makers used the standardization tools of 
the Bologna Process. Thus, the academic life was reorganized according to the three-
cycles, program offerings were calculated in credit/hours, in accordance to the European 
Credit Transfer System, and in terms of curriculum development the focus was made on 
the learning outcomes. These tools were articulated in the accreditation criteria and the 
HEIs were assessed according to their conformance to those. In this manner, QA system 
as a state standardization tool, suspended academic autonomy.  
In its turn, internal QA units at the HEIs acted as enforcement units of the NEAC’s 
regulations. The law on higher education obliged public HEIs to create QA units. According 
to the law, QA units aimed to regularly assess the quality of teaching, research, and to 
foster professional development of the academic personnel. QA units had to also increase 
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transparency of the HEI’s operations. In addition, they were to assist the HEI in self-
assessment process and prepare it for the external review (Law on Higher Education, 
2004). As many describe in their interviews, QA units started to organize university life 
and brought in elements of accountability to the HEIs where the authority of professors 
was never questioned. A local expert shared insights from her experience as a head of the 
QA, where she considered the interventions of the QA unit to leave a positive mark on the 
university life:  
When the QA units (in the HEIs) were created, professors realized that someone actually reviews 
whatever they write. Previously, when we were writing annual reports, we had cases, that they 
(professors) were submitting the same document repeatedly. They were only changing the cover 
page. That’s because there was no one to read it. QA units brought certain level of accountability 
(R44-LExpert 2).  
On the downside, together with a certain level of organization and certainty, QA units 
encouraged conformance. The institutional accreditation was a mandatory procedure for 
the state HEIs to gain degree awarding power and to be eligible for the state grant. Most 
of the state HEIs, in order to minimize the level of deviation from the state requirements, 
standardized their academic life. For instance, in most of the state HEIs, the outlines of the 
syllabus were standardized across the HEI, so were the assessment methods. For instance, 
in one of the HEIs all midterm evaluations were carried out through centralized mid-term 
tests (R43-LExpert 1). Standardization of academic life became perverse. Firstly, the 
ministry was prone to overregulated academic life and secondly, the HEIs were then 
prone to apply more rigid requirements internally.  
The growing centralization and constant intrusion of the government, particularly of the 
MES in the HEI’s life aggravated the few but vocal members of the academic community, 
who took these actions of the government as an offence on academic freedom. For 
instance, a local expert and long-term faculty of one of the state universities considered it 
unacceptable that state had stripped HEIs from their autonomous rights, and viewed it as 
the main offence on the ultimate mission of the university as a knowledge generator: 
(The system) is being centralized not because there are no (human) recourses that (would take 
responsibility for autonomous action), but for the university as a space for critical thinking to 
seize to exist! […] The government should stop intervening in the university! It should not think 
that if the university has a critical perspective towards the government then these universities 
are the spaces that compromise their political rule (R45 – LExpert 3). 
Although other respondents did not express themselves so dramatically, the majority 
viewed the standardization of the academic life negatively and considered it often 
irrelevant (R2-HEI1; R12-HEI2; R31-HEI5). 
Furthermore, another component of academic autonomy is the HEI’s ability to decide 
upon the number of students and on the selection criteria of students. The first has 
important implications for the HEI’s profile and finances. The second contributes to 
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ensuring quality and matching student interest with the programs offered (Estermann et 
al., 2011). In both instances, an HEIs’ decision making power is close to nonexistent.  
Previously, the decision over a student’s admission resided with the HEIs. However, in 
2004 it was taken away from the HEIs as the main source of corruption and was 
substituted by a unified national entrance examination. The admissions process was 
managed by the National Examination Centre. Based on three exams, the center 
determined the level of success of the prospective students and granted student vouchers 
according to the 100%, 70% and 50% success scale. Students that had succeeded in the 
national entrance exams could choose from a number of preferable educational 
institutions, where they would allocate their state-provided vouchers (MES, Decree N 
19/N, 2011). In the first years of the reform, HEIs were not allowed to introduce 
additional admission criteria either. Moreover, the number of students was also decided 
according to a formula that was developed by the NEAC. The same center, as a part of the 
institutional accreditation process would determine the maximum number of students 
that the particular HEI could admit (NEAC, 2006). These restrictions greatly affected the 
academic autonomy of the HEIs. One of the faculty members of a newly established 
university complained that the university had no mechanisms to select students. On the 
contrary, the students were choosing the HEI. 
The university cannot select a student, hence the university cannot control the quality, because 
the (quality is defined) through money-follows-student scheme (R10 - HEI2). 
The unified exams were designed to abolish corruption at the admission phase. The exams 
were also designed to create equal opportunity for the students of different social and 
economic backgrounds (Chakhaia, 2013). Thus, accommodation of the HEIs’ concerns 
regarding the quality was not prioritized.3  
To conclude, the evidence provided in this section shows that, for policy makers, academic 
autonomy was part of their decentralization effort. Policy makers viewed decentralization 
as a main tool of institutional transformation of the HEIs, thus they left academic 
autonomy outside of the sphere of their interest. Ever increasing standardization, which 
caused the discontent of the academic community was also justified according to the 
ministry’s conviction that the institutional framework of the HE system was so fragile that 
the provision of a considerable degree of autonomy would compromise the development 
of the system.  
Financial Autonomy  
                                                          
3 Only in 2011, the HEIs’ plea for the state to relax the strict student admission mechanism was accommodated 
by introducing a fourth elective examination in the scheme. According to this scheme, the examination center 
provided a list of possible disciplines, in which it would hold an exam and the HEIs could assign one of them to 
the degree program that they wanted (MES, Decree N19/N; 4. 2011). 
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Financial autonomy is certainly the area where the links to the other dimensions of 
autonomy are the most obvious. The ability or inability of universities to decide on tuition 
fees has implications for student admissions, state regulations on salaries for academic 
staff of the public institutions impinge on staffing autonomy, and the capacity to 
independently disperse university funds directly impacts the ability to implement a 
defined strategy (Estermann et al, 2009). In the University Autonomy Tool, financial 
autonomy is defined as capacity of the HEI to acquire and allocate funding, to set tuition 
fees, and to own and manage buildings/infrastructure (EUA, 2011). Put differently, the 
purpose of financial autonomy is to provide the mechanism of financial stability and 
independence to the HEI in order to pursue academic freedom.  
The perspective of preserving or granting academic freedom to the HEIs through financial 
stability and independence was not apparent in the discussions with the Georgian policy 
makers. Nevertheless, financial autonomy, as a term, is part of the definition of the HEI 
autonomy in the Law (Law on Higher Education, 2004, Chapter 2) and provisions to 
decentralize previously centralized financial control were also developed (Law on Higher 
Education 2004, Chapter 26). 
In further analysis, several system level factors need to be considered. For the policy 
makers, financial decentralization together with financial transparency were part of the 
decentralization reforms that were both supported domestically and recommended by 
the international community. Domestically, it was driven by practical considerations of 
efficiency. Over the course of the years of post-Soviet transition, the country suffered 
significant resource erosion thus, maintaining higher education institutions under the 
state-subsidy was a tremendous burden, especially under the budget constraints that the 
ministry was facing. One of the former deputy ministers explained that the state was 
moving towards minimizing its financial responsibilities with the HEIs and at the same 
time, aimed at boosting competitive environment among them (R39 -PA8). Externally, the 
MES was fulfilling the commitment that the country had made in 2004 to the UN, 
articulated in the Millennium Development Goals Georgia (MDG Georgia). According to 
the MDG Georgia “[t]he main objectives of tertiary education reform should include the 
full autonomy4 of tertiary institutions, the establishment of a competitive climate for 
public and private institutions, the eradication of the state order tradition…” (UNDP, 
2004, p. 31-32). These considerations implied changes in the funding scheme of higher 
education that in turn had implications for the commitment of the government to the 
financial autonomy of the HEIs. 
In brief, to overcome scarcity of state funds, policy makers introduced the concept of 
revenue diversification, pressuring HEIs to diversify their funding portfolios through 
introducing tuition fees, attracting grants, donations and other nonpublic revenues. To 
support the transition from the state-subsidized operation to the self-sustained mode, the 
                                                          
4 my emphasis. 
HERJ Hungarian Educational Research Journal, Vol 7 (2017), No 1 
22 
state made several revenue sources available to the HEIs. In order to support research in 
the HEIs, the state made funds available for the research and created the new semi-
governmental agencies of the Georgian National Science Foundation and the Foundation 
of Kartvelian Studies, Humanities and Social Sciences.5 Most importantly, instead of the 
state subsidized higher education, the funding scheme was changed into per capita 
funding, known as the “money-follows-student” scheme. Those students, with the high 
scores at the national unified entrance exams were eligible for the state grant, which they 
could allocate at the HEI and the academic program of their choice. Both research grants 
and student voucher grants were available for public as well as private institutions (Law 
on Higher Education, 2004). Apart from the per capita funding, the state financed state 
HEIs through direct budgetary lump sum allocations and through earmarked allocations 
for infrastructure development and research (Machabeli et al., 2011; UNDP, 2008).  
For the state HEIs, tuition fees accounted for 75% of the total income. Only about a fifth 
was offset by state-funded merit and needs-based grants. By the year 2009, about 25% of 
state HEI income came from direct state allocations (18% in the form of lump sum funding 
and 7% from other forms of state support). Including the student merit based vouchers 
and other funding schemes, the state funded 42% of the costs of state HEIs (Machabeli et 
al., 2011).6 Overall, the Georgian HE system went from the state-funded to the private 
funding scheme, where only 25 % of the HEI’s budget comprised of direct state 
allocations. For the remainder, they were in competition with other public as well as 
private HEIs. It is true that the state was a major funding source thus increasing state HEIs’ 
dependency on the state and hindering its financial autonomy.  
With the efforts of financial decentralization, the HEIs’ budgets were no longer subject to 
the approval of the ministry. According to the law, HEIs could create and approve their 
budgets. HEIs were free to manage their finances, but had to make their budgets publicly 
available (Law on Higher Education, 2004, Chapter 26, NEAC, 2007). According to the 
Law, another component of financial autonomy was to decentralize the budgeting process 
to the departments within the universities.7 While the Law formally gave greater 
autonomy to the academic departments, financial decentralization was not practiced by 
the universities. The departments remained dependent on the central university budget 
allocations (R20-HEI4; R4-HEI1; R28-HEI5). During the interviews, the deans and rectors 
of the HEIs did voice concerns regarding the level of decentralization within the HEIs as 
                                                          
5 In 2010 the two organizations were merged into Georgian National Science Foundation (GNSF). 
6 In a comparative perspective, taking the university system as a whole, in 2009, the state funded 35% of 
the costs of the HE system, which is about half of the average OECD public expenditure (67% in 2008) on 
tertiary education institutions (Machabeli et al, 2011) 
7 The distribution of budgetary funds within the HEI is a controversial issue since it involved the governance 
relationships between central administration representing the HEI as a whole and individual units within 
the HEI (See Geiger, 2004). 
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they thought that departments were not yet ready to accept the responsibility of 
budgeting themselves (R1 - HEI1).  
However, the constraints were higher than the benefits of the decentralized system. Once 
the tuition fees were institutionalized, it was also decided that the state was to calculate 
the cost of the academic programs across the state HEIs. The decision was made because 
of the time and financial efficiency. As an interviewee explained, there was no time to 
calculate the real costs of programs which is why the ministry set the standard ceiling for 
all academic programs under which the HEIs could maneuver. The ceiling of 2250 GEL 
(840 Euro) was set for every program. The student grant of 100% comprised the same 
amount. Many HEIs disagreed with this policy choice.  
In addition, state HEIs were subject to the legal provisions of the public law under the 
supervision of the MES. This means that certain restrictions applied. For instance, the 
salary ceilings for the HEI’s staff could not exceed the salary of the ministry’s employees, 
which obviously, made it difficult to attract qualified staff to the HEIs. One of the HEI 
representatives perceived this as a disadvantage of the state HEIs in comparison to the 
private HEIs:  
These organizations (HEIs) have no right to pay their staff higher salary than to the staff at the 
ministry. It is also difficult to attract professors, this is also restricted by a certain rule about 
hiring and firing of the academic personnel. (R10-HEI2) 
In addition, HEIs were subject to the inflexible state procurement policies and were also 
not able to keep the surplus, but had to return it to the state budget.  
The third component that needs attention is the level of financial transparency. Financial 
transparency was a main state priority falling under the anti-corruption reforms. After 
the revolution, in the country, a separate entity of financial police was created to address 
the gaps in the financial operations for both public and private organizations. State HEIs 
were subjects of the same scrutiny. They were reporting on a quarterly basis to the State 
Revenue Office and were submitting annual financial reports to the ministry of education 
as well. However, HEIs were rarely providing internal transparency. This is how one of 
the faculty members describes the situation:  
I have been a member of a faculty board for three years. It has been three years that I am 
requesting a financial report from the faculty. […] I have not seen that report. … and I receive a 
ridiculous response from one of the administrators that this information will be made available 
[internally] only after the financial declaration has been submitted to the revenue office. My 
answer to this is: ‘The declaration is submitted [to the Revenue Office] by 15th of each month, 
and if the date of today is 20th, then it [the declaration] has been submitted already. Let me see 
the report’. The response is: ‘We don’t have it’. (R45 - LExpert 3). 
To summarize, the purpose of financial autonomy as of a guarantor for the HEI to maintain 
academic freedom was absent among the policy makers. The main consideration for 
financial autonomy was efficiency; the state meant to elevate financial burden from the 
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state budget and relocate it to the HEIs. Financial decentralization and financial 
transparency were part of the decentralization reforms that overwhelmed the transition 
phase of the reforms from 2004 to 2007. In essence, the purpose of financial autonomy 
did not resemble its original purpose proposed by the EUA (2001, 2003, 2011). Despite 
this, some structural elements were created in the system although the scarcity of 
recourses keeps HEIs dependent on state funding. This allows for the finding that financial 
autonomy is also decoupled.  
Conclusion  
The analysis of university autonomy reforms in Georgia shows that policy makers 
introduced the reforms to gain external legitimacy at the EHEA. University autonomy 
reforms created a decoupled institution that only symbolically bears resemblance to its 
Bologna-promoted prototype. The structural elements of the university autonomy 
framework were aligned with the Bologna-promoted model of autonomy. However, the 
purpose of the autonomy in the HE system of Georgia did not fit with the original purpose 
of ‘impartiality with accountability’ promoted by the Bologna Process. University 
autonomy as a principle of the university’s governance was never part of the policy 
discussions. Instead, it was a part of the government’s overall decentralization efforts.  
In more specific terms, while legally ensuring university autonomy as the main principle 
of HE governance, university autonomy has been compromised with the standardization 
and overregulation efforts of the government. In order to have a system-wide effect, the 
ministry of education set up a detailed regulatory framework to guide the universities 
into autonomous action. With the aim of creating a level playing field for all HEIs in the 
system, policy makers standardized university life through the quality assurance 
requirements, hence suspending academic autonomy of the HEIs.  
In its turn, the decentralization was a measure for minimizing the risk of accumulating 
power in the rector’s hands. Therefore, it was not autonomy, but a closely supervised 
decentralization of university life. With the rhetoric of autonomy, the post-revolution 
government curbed the independence of the state universities. By instituting rigid 
regulations to autonomous action, the MES indirectly gained authority over the state HEIs. 
Authority which it did not have before the revolution. In other words, while emulating the 
principles of autonomous actor-hood, the policy makers became reluctant to give up the 
control over the HEIs, which they had gained during the institutional flux brought by the 
revolution.  
Finally, this analysis of university autonomy provides a distinct example of the tensions 
between a transnationally pursued purpose of the institutions and the considerations of 
the local policy makers. The local conditions and policy makers’ perceptions regarding the 
challenges of the Georgian HE system come in almost complete contradiction with the 
principles of university autonomy, as proposed by the Bologna Process. Yet, they are 
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symbolically reconciled at the institutional level. Essentially, university autonomy 
“speaks” of autonomy, but demands compliance.  
As the results of the research show, Georgia as a state at Europe’s periphery consciously 
adopted the Bologna-guided reforms for the primary purpose of gaining legitimacy at the 
European level. As a result, I argue that the Georgian HE system gained high institutional 
proximity to its Western prototypes, however failed to imbed those in the national context 
thus creating a decoupled institution in the system.  
The examples of decoupled institutions can also be found in other policy areas. Hence, I 
suggest that the findings of this study are relevant not only for the developments in higher 
education but in other policy areas as well. The findings discussed in the article are not 
unique to the Georgian context and are relevant for the countries that underwent the post-
Soviet transition. The article suggests that the countries in a post-soviet transition are 
subject to the transnational policy transfer and are prone to creating decoupled 
institutions. On this front, findings provided in this article shed light on the policy making 
processes that are at play in transitioning societies. Moreover, by mobilizing the 
theoretical toolbox of the world society theory, this study helps to address the gap in the 
literature on policy transfer explaining the cases of decoupled institutional constellations.  
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